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Only a small amount of research has been carried out on the estab-lishment of Mormonism (moermenjiao 摩爾門教) in the People’sRepublic of China (PRC), due to the recent nature of this move, its
limited demographic scope, and the discretion of the social actors in-
volved. (1) Yet it deserves the attention of observers of religion and of China
for several reasons. Firstly, the spread in China of a religion that was born in
the United States in the nineteenth century provides an opportunity to ob-
serve a particular process of glocalisation, and in this way fuels the debate
concerning the spread and local adaptation of a globalised religious order.
Secondly, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (LDS Church; Ye-
sujidu houqi shengtu jiaohui 耶穌基督後期聖徒教會 ) appears to have a
number of characteristics that could be expected to impede its establish-
ment in China, given the religious regulations in force. Indeed, it is a highly
bureaucratic, hierarchical, and centralised organisation managed from the
United States, and one that advocates the strong allegiance of its members
to the institution. (2) In theory, such organisations cannot develop legally on
Chinese territory. Thirdly, the strategy adopted by the LDS Church to estab-
lish itself in the PRC is based on dialogue with Beijing and the strict obser-
vance of religious regulations to obtain official authorisation of its activities.
At a time when, despite government repression, (3) other Christian religions
are spreading in China outside the legal framework, this appears to be an
atypical approach. (4) Using existing scientific, journalistic, and ecclesiastical
literature, and interviews, observations, and information gathered on the
ground, (5) this article aims to shed light on the situation of the LDS Church
in China by examining the foundations, forms, and some of the observable
effects of this strategy, in particular in terms of institutional development
and the religious identities produced locally.
From missionary church to diplomatic
church (6)
The strategy of the LDS Church needs to be looked at in the light of the
history of its relations with China. Soon after the movement became es-
tablished in the western United States, Mormon leaders sent reconnaissance
missions to various parts of the world. As early as 1851, missionaries were
sent for short periods of time to Asia, and in 1852, two of them went to
Hong Kong, which was then a British colony. But the Taiping Rebellion
(1851-1864) discouraged them from exploring continental China. (7) The un-
enthusiastic reception given by both locals and colonists to the Mormon
message in Hong Kong, compounded by difficulties in adapting to the cli-
mate, culture, and language, got the better of their mission there. The mis-
sionaries returned to Salt Lake City after less than a year with an
unfavourable view of opening a mission in China. (8) Although Protestantism
was developing during the same period in China’s foreign concessions and
beyond, it remained out of bounds to the still fledgling LDS Church. In 1910,
on his return from a successful mission to Japan, Alma O. Taylor visited Korea
and China in order to once more assess the possibilities of a missionary
drive. (9) The report he submitted to LDS Church leaders was once again neg-
ative, for the same reasons as before.
A third foray into China was attempted in 1921, when David O. McKay,
leader and future president of the LDS Church, undertook a “world tour
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A. Palmer, “From ‘Congregations’ to ‘Small Group Community Building’,” Chinese Sociological Re-
view, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2012, pp. 78-98.
2. Thomas F. O’Dea, “Mormonism and the Avoidance of Sectarian Stagnation: A Study of Church,
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3. Daniel Bays, “Chinese Protestant Christianity Today,” The China Quarterly, No. 174, 2003, pp. 488-
504.
4. Other religious organisations, including Bahá’í and Yiguandao, are in talks with the Chinese au-
thorities as part of different strategies and operating modes. See: Sébastien Billioud, “Le rôle de
l’éducation dans le projet salvateur du Yiguandao” (The role of education in the Yiguandao salutory
project), Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident, No. 33, 2011, pp. 211-234; David A. Palmer, “From
‘Congregations’ to ‘Small Group Community Building,’” art. cit.
5. In-depth individual interviews conducted with 18 Chinese people who have converted to Mor-
monism and live in the PRC, in addition to various observations and informal discussions in the
context of a broader survey into the workings of the affiliation and conversion of Chinese people
to Christian or para-Christian organisations.
6. As the LDS Church is not a state, the term “diplomatic” should not be understood in the strict
sense of the term. It refers here rather to the relations between a transnational religious institution
and a state, as a form of non-governmental diplomacy comparable to that practised by non-gov-
ernmental organisations.
7. For a detailed account of this episode, see Lanier R. Britsch, From the East: The History of the Lat-
ter-day Saints in Asia, Salt Lake City, UT, Deseret Book Co., 1998, pp. 8-40; Church News, www.ld-
schurchnews.com/articles/58550/Country-information-China.html (accessed on 20 April 2013).
8. Lanier R. Britsch, From the East, op. cit., p. 36 ff.
9. Reid L. Neilson, “Alma O. Taylor’s Fact-Finding Mission to China,” BYU Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2001,
pp. 176-203.
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of missions” in order to identify new development opportunities for the
organisation. Although he made the symbolic gesture of consecrating
China to missionary work at this time, (10) the first Mormon mission on
Chinese soil would not open until 28 years later, in 1949. (11) As the year
of their arrival coincided with the Communist takeover of the mainland,
the Mormon emissaries remained confined to Hong Kong and Macao.
Then, in 1956, the first Mormon missionaries set foot on the island of Tai-
wan, and the LDS Church has since then enjoyed stable and moderate
growth in these three territories. In 2009, there were 32 Mormon congre-
gations in Hong Kong with 23,223 members, 1,260 believers in Macao,
and a total of 91 congregations and 49,054 followers in Taiwan. (12)
Despite this moderate but sustained level of development in the Chinese
cultural area, the continent’s doors stayed closed to the LDS Church for
over a century. At the start of the 1980s, when China was opening up to
the world and starting its economic transition, the leaders of the LDS
Church, which was growing rapidly on a global scale at the time, tried their
luck once more. The customary missionary strategy, based on evangelising
populations, gave way to a strategy based on political and legal negotiation
with representatives of the Chinese state, apparently relegating evangeli-
sation to the background. This strategy was first implemented in 1979,
when a dance troupe from the Mormon Brigham Young University (BYU),
the Young Ambassadors, was granted the opportunity to perform in Beijing
and other Chinese cities with the support of influential businessmen and
politicians. (13) This tour, and the many others that followed, provided an
opportunity to forge relations with economic and political players, which
led to the establishment of a dialogue between the Mormon and Chinese
authorities. Henceforth, discussion and negotiation between representa-
tives of the LDS Church and of the Chinese state was to be the privileged
means by which the LDS Church sought to achieve legitimacy in China,
while during the same period, Christianity was spreading in various forms
over the territory, brought in by zealous evangelists and religious organi-
sations – of both local and foreign origin – who favoured putting in work
on the ground over political negotiations. Contacts between Mormon dig-
nitaries and Beijing involved members of the highest grades of the two ad-
ministrations. Between 1980 and 1996, a number of official Chinese
delegations established contact with the LDS Church and its leaders during
official visits to the United States, and several senior Mormon leaders vis-
ited China in their capacity as religious leaders. (14) The most striking of
these visits included those made in 1994 by Li Lanqing, then Vice-Premier
of the State Council, to the Polynesian Cultural Center (owned by the LDS
Church) in Hawaii, and that made two years later by Gordon B. Hinckley,
president of the LDS Church, to the China Folk Culture Villages in Shenzhen.
Alongside these informal meetings on the occasion of academic or cultural
events, negotiations and discussions took place between senior leaders and
lawyers of the LDS Church and high-ranking civil servants responsible for
religious affairs. (15) These meetings generated positive reports on the Mor-
mon side concerning a possible expansion into China and, surprisingly, con-
cerning the state of religious freedom in the country. In January 1989, two
Mormon leaders returning from China stated:
We have assurance from the highest levels of Chinese government
that people are free to practice religious beliefs in China. […] We were
assured that the people in China or Chinese citizens who are abroad
are free to join any religious denomination they choose and to prac-
tice the tenets of that religion in China without fear of repression.
[…] You can be a Latter-day Saint and live in the People’s Republic of
China, and you won’t be isolated from your fellow members of the
Church or penalised for your beliefs.” (16)
Despite this initial enthusiasm, meetings began to take place with greater
discretion after 1996, and announcements made by the LDS Church focused
on the fact that it did not have an official presence in China and that it was
not sending missionaries there. This discretion proved to be a condition for
the continuation of dialogue with the Chinese state. 
It is only possible to speculate on the reasons that pushed the Chinese state
to embark on and maintain such a dialogue. During a period of economic and
social reform brought about by the need for pragmatism, the Chinese author-
ities doubtless saw an opportunity to test a new form of religious manipula-
tion by benefitting, through cooperation, from the social resources produced
by a religious organisation that presented itself as being capable of producing
players respectful of the law and actively contributing to social stability and
economic prosperity. The risk, meanwhile, was minimal, given the extremely
limited size of the Mormon population of China. By agreeing to conduct a di-
alogue with an American religious organisation, and possibly allowing it mar-
gins for manoeuvre, the Chinese state was also providing itself with proof of
its own credibility and with counter-arguments that it could point to in the
face of criticism and pressure brought to bear by the international community
with regard to the observance of human rights and individual freedoms. How-
ever, since giving too much visibility to its adoption of a relatively accommo-
dating attitude towards a foreign and heterodox organisation risked stirring
up the religious demands of other organisations, Beijing adopted a discrete
position and insisted that the LDS Church do the same. (17) This insistence on
discretion was stepped up in the 2000s and was scrupulously observed by the
LDS Church, because the increase in the number of LDS followers in China
preached caution at a time when experiments by the Chinese state in religious
matters was giving rise to critical situations. (18)
2010 marked another change of direction, when three major announce-
ments were made concerning the situation of Mormonism in China. On 30
August 2010, the LDS Church released a short statement concerning its ac-
tivities in China:
The First Presidency and other senior leaders at Church headquarters
in Salt Lake City have had discussions with a senior official of the
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10. The transcription of the words spoken on the occasion of this ritual is available at the following
website: www.ldschinese.com/library/dedications/CD.html (accessed on 20 April 2013).
11. Lanier R. Britsch, From the East, op. cit., pp. 227-231.
12. Small congregations form “branches” (fenhui), while the larger ones are known as “parishes” (zhi-
hui). More data is available at Church News, www.ldschurchnews.com/articles/58550/Country-
information-China.html and Cumorah, www.cumorah.com/index.php?target=main (accessed on
20 April 3013).
13. For an account of the initial meetings: Dallin H. Oaks, “Getting to Know China,” BYU Speeches,
1991, http://speeches.byu.edu/?act=viewitem&id=572 (accessed on 20 April 2013).
14. Church News, www.ldschurchnews.com/articles/58550/Country-information-China.html (ac-
cessed on 20 April 2013).
15. It is difficult to obtain accurate information concerning the players involved and the modes of
negotiation. At a minimum, they involved agents of the State Administration for Religious Affairs
and agents of the National Security Bureau.
16. Statement made by Dallin H. Oaks and Russel M. Nelson, Church News, 28 January 1989, www.ld-
schurchnews.com/articles/19535/China-Two-apostles-visit-assured-that-religious-freedom-ex-
ists-and-people-are-free-to-worship-as-they-choose.html (accessed on 20 April 2013).
17. See Kim-Kwong Chan, “Religion in China in the Twenty-first Century: Some Scenarios,” Religion,
State & Society, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2005, pp. 87-119.
18. During this time, Falun Gong, which had previously been tolerated, was violently repressed. 
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People’s Republic of China from Beijing, and have established a rela-
tionship, which we expect will lead to regularising the activities of
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in China. (19)
This statement made relations between the LDS Church and Beijing public
and, with the approval of Beijing, made the existence of a discussion and
formal negotiations between the two entities official. It also allowed the
Chinese government to assert its ability to keep an ambitious foreign reli-
gious organisation under its control, as part of a renewed political will to
bring religious groups of uncertain status back under the rule of law. (20) Then,
in December 2012, Russell M. Nelson, a senior leader of the LDS Church and
honorary professor at Shandong University, restated the intention of the
LDS Church not to send missionaries to China:
One popular rumor in circulation is in regard to missionaries who are
called to one area and transferred to open the work in another for-
merly closed area, such as China […] Such rumors are absolutely
false. […] Leaders of this Church enter countries new to the Church
through the front door. We do not go in through the back door or
via the alley. Our relationships are based on honesty, openness, in-
tegrity, and complete compliance with local law. (21)
This message, addressed to a Mormon audience, also represented a public
re-assertion of the LDS Church’s commitment to comply with the rules is-
sued by Beijing. Indeed, two months later, the LDS Church opened a website
in Chinese (traditional and simplified) and in English, confirming the exis-
tence of Chinese congregations formed with the approval of Beijing since
2004 and restating the limits governing its exercise of religious activity. (22)
It is presented as being intended for Chinese people who have converted
while abroad and wish to know the conditions under which they can prac-
tise their faith on their return to China. It also implicitly expresses Beijing’s
acceptance of partially publicising (23) the presence of the LDS Church in
China. Adopting the negotiation strategy appears to have enabled the LDS
Church to acquire a precarious, but no less real, level of recognition there,
and although it has no official status, it is authorised to exercise its activity
in a limited and strictly controlled manner.
The “red church” strategy?
The strategy adopted by the LDS Church therefore aims to comply with
the rules decreed by Beijing in order to obtain authorisation to practise its
religious activity, and ultimately to gain official status in China. Since it is
neither prohibited nor fully authorised, the LDS Church is currently posi-
tioned in the grey market of religion but is seeking to enter the red market
of legal religious organisations. (24) This will involve a significant adjustment
and the renunciation of certain normal development methods that are nev-
ertheless anchored in the culture of the organisation, such as systematic
evangelisation by full-time volunteer missionaries, encouragement of lay
members to openly share their faith, and image building marketing (25) aimed
at a wide audience. The leaders of the LDS Church swiftly accepted the need
to adapt, as illustrated by this statement made by a senior leader in 1991:
People sometimes ask me about what can be done to “open China.”
In response, I state my belief that China is already “open” – it is we
who are closed. […] We expect the Orient to be the same as the
West, China to be the same as Canada or Chile. We must open our
minds and our hearts to the people of this ancient realm (sic) and
this magnificent culture. We must understand their way of thinking,
their aspirations, and their impressive accomplishments. We must
observe their laws and follow their example of patience. We must
deserve to be their friends. (26)
But what this declaration pandering to a certain Chinese nationalism does
not say is that a total adaptation of the LDS Church to the laws in force
would involve abandoning the direction of its movement on Chinese terri-
tory. Indeed, no religious movement managed from abroad can be legally
recognised, and at present, China’s Mormons would have to affiliate them-
selves with the existing national religious associations, or more improbably,
found a sixth independent national religious association if they wish to
enjoy official recognition. If the government were to accept such an even-
tuality, the LDS Church would be in a situation comparable to that of the
Catholic Church in China: (27) its allegiance would no longer be to its inter-
national headquarters, but to the Chinese state, which would control the
movement from within; it would therefore become schismatic. This will to
adapt also does not seem to question the enviable – or less enviable – char-
acter of official church status, as the doctrinal, clerical, and material restric-
tions weighing on organisations that already enjoy this status are pushing
many believers towards the grey and black markets of religion.
However, the adoption of this strategy is not without foundation, and
rests first and foremost on a gamble taken by LDS leaders, who hope that
there will be, in the medium term, a softening of religious regulations and
a redefinition of the “red church” that will safeguard the organisation from
schism. (28) Such a softening is now more than merely hypothetical.
Three reasons shed light on why a strategy based on such a gamble was
adopted. Firstly, the hierarchical and centralised structure of the LDS Church
aims to maintain a unified organisation by applying, at a local level, the di-
rectives issued in Salt Lake City. Local leaders, though enjoying a certain
amount of independence in the management of the congregations they
oversee, are required to observe these directives and report to their superiors
on a regular basis. The system aims to preserve doctrinal, ritual, and nor-
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19. The First Presidency and the Council of the Twelve Apostles form a body made up of the 15 high-
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26. Dallin H. Oaks, “Getting to Know China,” art. cit.
27. Richard Madsen, “Catholic Revival During the Reform Era,” China Quarterly, No. 174, 2003,
pp. 468 ff.
28. This matches the third and fourth scenarios concerning the development of religion set out in
Kim-Kwong Chan, “Religion in China in the Twenty-first Century,” art. cit.
Pierre Vendassi – Mormonism and the Chinese State
mative uniformity, regardless of the context in which it is being estab-
lished, thus promoting and exporting a social and cultural model with its
religious content. This means that the religious project and the way in
which the LDS Church is organised clash with the conditions in which an
underground activity can develop, for two opposing reasons. On the one
hand, congregations that are created illegally in China run the risk of find-
ing themselves separated from the main organisation, and therefore be-
coming schismatic. (29) On the other hand, unlike Protestant house
churches, which are able to resist government repression because each
cell is independent with regard to the others, any repression that may be
carried out against a clandestine LDS branch could potentially threaten
all the other branches of the organisation, given the links that unite all
the branches. 
Secondly, the strategy of the LDS Church rests internationally on the
aim of becoming a legally recognised movement wherever it establishes
itself, and of promoting the idea that a good Mormon is also a citizen
who observes the law. This policy of “coming in through the front door”
is based on a doctrine of submission to the law and obedience, which
is part of the creed of the LDS Church. (30) In this sense, the indepen-
dentist fervour of nineteenth century utopian Mormonism has largely
given way to an increased willingness to promote the model and image
of a socially and politically integrated Mormonism, regardless of the
context. 
A third reason, which is both pragmatic and historical, supplements the
first two. First of all, it concerns the typically American experience of the
movement. Starting as a sectarian, utopian, and millenarian movement,
the LDS Church gradually “normalised” itself under the effect of socio-po-
litical pressures until it was fully integrated into the ordinary religious land-
scape of the United States. This normalisation doubtless helped create
conditions favourable to its development; (31) observing the laws of the
United States generally results in a guarantee, in return, of being allowed
to exercise religious activity in freedom, owing to a principle of “separation
of Church and State” that governs relations between religious and political
powers. The same does not apply in China, where regulations aim specifi-
cally to limit religious activity rather than to allow it to be exercised freely.
However, adapting a strategy of observing the law from the American con-
text to one marked by legal hostility to religion has been proven to pay off
in the past. The growth of Mormonism in East Germany is one notable
precedent that left a mark on the collective imagination of the movement.
The establishment of relationships of trust with local political leaders and
the observance of the rules in force meant the LDS Church was allowed to
conduct its activities there and to build places of worship with the consent
of the authorities during the Cold War and before the fall of the Berlin
Wall. (32) Backed by the force of this experience, the leaders of the LDS
Church are now seeking to reproduce in China a strategy that has enabled
it to find favourable outcomes on a number of occasions when faced with
religious restrictions. 
Acquiring instrumental legitimacy
Amidst the demands linked to its structure, doctrine, and historical her-
itage and those imposed by the religious and political context of China, the
LDS Church has been attempting in a variety of ways since 1979 to forge
an image considered respectable by the Chinese elites in order to increase
its margins of manoeuvre.
The Mormon university, BYU, plays a fundamental role in promoting a
positive image of Mormonism through cultural and academic activities.
After the Young Ambassadors, other troupes have performed regularly in
China since 1979, enjoying perennial if somewhat limited success. The tours
made by these groups provide the opportunity for institutional players who
belong to the Mormon faith to extend their network of relationships within
the Chinese elite. At the beginning of the 1980s, the LDS Church sent English
teachers to Chinese universities, seeing this as an opportunity to prove its
social utility to the government at a time of globalisation. In 1988, the China
Teachers Program was set up in the David M. Kennedy Center for Interna-
tional Studies of BYU. Since 1995, more than 60 English teachers have taken
part in this programme each year, in particular teaching in 19 Chinese uni-
versities in major centres, including prestigious universities such as Fudan
and Jiaotong in Shanghai or Renmin and Tsinghua in Beijing. (33) These teach-
ers are retired volunteering couples from the United States who have aca-
demic experience or specific skills. While they are not involved in
proselytism, they do help increase the respectability of the LDS Church
through their work and through their behaviour within Chinese institutions,
and they also promote Mormon culture to the future Chinese elite attending
these universities. Indeed, since 1989 more than 1,200 students have been
coming into contact each year with Mormon teachers. Even though they
may not have been able to form a clear idea of the doctrine or religious
practices of the LDS Church, they are, as a result of these encounters, made
familiar with Mormon players, who are the messengers of a specific religious
culture they have been selected to represent. (34)
There are also a number of academic exchange programmes linking LDS
Church-affiliated universities with certain Chinese universities. Such ex-
changes help create links of cooperation with China and the Chinese elite,
while also contributing, marginally, to the spread of Mormonism in China:
by enabling Chinese citizens to visit the United States, the LDS Church is
giving itself the chance to convert Chinese nationals outside their country
who could, in the long term, fill its congregations in China.
The LDS Church also uses other instruments of a non-proselytising na-
ture to convince the government of its social usefulness. For example, LDS
Charities, a Mormon non-governmental organisation (NGO), has a pres-
ence in China through volunteer senior couples whose skills and past po-
sitions give them an increased level of legitimacy. It establishes relations
with local actors by setting up humanitarian, educational, and social proj-
ects in the least developed regions of China. Certain legal NGOs that de-
pend directly on the LDS Church contribute to the dialogue with the
authorities by offering their expertise and assistance to the rulers and legal
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players of China in terms of developing ideas to improve the setting up
of the rule of law.
Finally, although it appears difficult to accurately grasp their true weight
in negotiations taking place between the LDS Church and the Chinese gov-
ernment, it should be noted that certain members of the LDS Church who
have left to live in China, as well as certain regional leaders, are knowledge-
able and respected businessmen and lawyers who doubtless employ their
skills and the relations they foster with economic and political players to
serve the ends of the organisation. (35)
Initiatives such as these, on which the Mormons base their strategy to
spread their movement, demonstrate little originality, at least to a point.
Many religious groups, in particular Christian ones, use cultural events,
university exchange programmes, the development of NGOs, and even
economic activity, to fulfil their undertaking to evangelise. Indeed, using
a legal cover under which to carry out religious activities in a concealed
manner is a feature that is taken for granted in the grey market of reli-
gion. (36) Where the strategy adopted by the LDS possibly differs is there-
fore in the transparency it demonstrates with regard to its religious
activities, and in the will to clearly distinguish these activities from social
activities aimed at constructing a positive image and a level of legitimacy
in the eyes of the authorities. The work of Mormon NGOs, English teach-
ers, and BYU is completely separated from any direct evangelisation ac-
tivity, and is carried out independently from local religious congregations,
whose social initiatives are far more localised and sporadic, and are the
result of individual philanthropic initiatives rather than a strategy spon-
sored by the transnational organisation. (37) Moreover, the LDS Church
shows a certain amount of zeal when it comes to complying with regu-
lations, accepting the control the authorities have over activities carried
out in the social as well as the religious sphere. No congregation conducts
its activity outside the legal framework, and local leaders regularly meet
local representatives of the State Administration for Religious Affairs in
order to report on their activities and remind their members of the reg-
ulations that need to be followed in order to be allowed to continue to
worship. (38)
Rather than deploying its economic, cultural, and human capital on
spreading its doctrine and on expanding the movement through the rank
and file, the LDS Church uses these resources to obtain institutional legiti-
macy and the trust of the authorities in charge of religious regulation in the
country. This represents another difference in the strategy adopted by the
LDS Church in China. Whereas religious groups generally prefer to establish
an active underground grassroots presence before considering dialogue with
local or national power-holders, the LDS Church favours negotiations with
national and then local authorities, with a view to subsequently reaching
out to the general population. This strategy initially appears to wholly follow
the official conception of religion promoted by the state, which aims to or-
ganise associations coordinated on a national scale, in a process that unrolls
from the state to the local player. However, such an approach would also
seem to go against a certain religious reality that is recognised, though not
actually spelled out, by the state itself. Indeed, according to the regulations
in force, a religious group can hope to register itself with the authorities if
it is able to prove its utility in terms of the regular nature of its meetings,
its organisational independence and its financial independence, all of which
assumes the existence of a grassroots religious activity, before any steps
can be taken towards legal recognition. (39) By favouring its institutional
recognition at a national level over its establishment among the population
as a whole, Mormonism could be considered, to a certain extent, to be re-
versing the current political logic when it comes to religion.
Margins for manoeuvre and limitations
However, the LDS Church has not completely given up spreading its
gospel within the Chinese population. At the end of the 1970s, Mormons
started visiting China for professional reasons; then in 1986, the first ex-
patriate branches were organised, made up mainly of Americans, first in
Beijing and Xi’an, then in Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Tianjin. (40) Today,
there are approximately 500 expatriate members spread over four dis-
tricts (meetings of geographically close congregations) and groups pres-
ent in around 20 cities. Yet negotiations have also made it possible for
the LDS Church to obtain some margins for manoeuvre in spreading the
Mormon faith in China within and beyond the boundaries imposed by
the state.
It is difficult to obtain accurate data concerning the development of the
LDS Church in China, insofar as neither the LDS Church nor the Chinese gov-
ernment communicate on this subject. Yet, very soon after China opened
up to the outside world, economic exchanges led to the conversion of Chi-
nese citizens outside the PRC who, on their return to the country, continued
to practise their faith, at least on an individual basis. Since 1990, the church
has appointed leaders of Chinese origin who are responsible for coordinating
and supervising the organisation in China. Although after that date it be-
came possible to organise assemblies, whose very limited size meant they
qualified as private activities rather than religious meetings, it was not until
after 2000 that the first branches were organised, enjoying generally tacit
authorisation to worship. Some branches have temporary, renewable written
permission from the national or local authorities to meet in certain premises
– rented offices or conference centres – while others have only verbal per-
mission, and the smaller groups meet at the home of one of their members
with the tacit consent of the authorities. These permissions also allow the
provision of materials (books, manuals, hymn books, etc.) necessary to con-
duct ordinary religious activities, which include Sunday meetings and daily
religious study programmes for adolescents, young unmarried adults, (41) and
the whole community.
According to our sources, China now has several thousand practising Mor-
mon believers and congregations in every province. The largest, which are
located in economically dynamic cities and provinces that are exposed to
international exchanges (Shandong, Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Xi’an, etc.),
have around a hundred active members and are organised into districts
along the lines of the standard Mormon organisational model. Others are
N o . 2 0 1 4 / 1  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 47
35. John Huntsman, US Ambassador to China from 2009 to 2011, was a Mormon missionary in Taiwan.
However, he did not hold any hierarchical position in the LDS Church during his term as ambas-
sador. The direct or indirect role he may have been able to play in discussions is unknown.
36. Yang Fenggang, “The Red, Black and Gray Markets of Religion in China,” art. cit.
37. In 2011, certain members of a congregation we studied took part, together with a Buddhist as-
sociation, in charity work, informally and without advertising their faith.
38. It therefore seems that any breach of the rules is the result of the individual initiative of converts,
who then run the risk of disapproval or may indeed be reprimanded by their superiors. The inter-
views carried out and observations made confirm that compliance with the regulations is not
merely a statement of good intentions.
39. Chan Kim-Kwong and Eric R. Carlson, Religious Freedom in China: A Research Handbook, Santa
Barbara, CA, ISAR, 2005, p. 28.
40. Church News, www.ldschurchnews.com/articles/58550/Country-information-China.html (ac-
cessed on 20 April 2013).
41. These two programmes, which are respectively named the “seminary” (shenxue yanjiu suo) and
the institute, were put in place in one of the branches that we observed.
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spread over the territory and may have just a handful of converts. (42) The
Mormon population of China looks derisory when compared with the total
population of the country or with all the Christian or para-Christian move-
ments spreading in China since the 1980s. Yet if the evangelical movements
in China are considered not as a whole, but as being formed on the one
hand from networks of churches comprising several thousand members,
and on the other hand from small independent networks with no more than
a few hundred participants, the LDS population becomes proportionally
comparable to many of them. Furthermore, the development of the move-
ment may appear to be slow, but it seems constant.
That said, it is nevertheless subject to margins for manoeuvre and limita-
tions. The first limitation concerns the possibility of engaging in proselytis-
ing activities, which are necessary to the development of the group.
Distributing any religious material or messages outside the space assigned
for worship is forbidden, as is encouraging others to adhere to the beliefs
and practices of the organisation. This limitation is tempered by several mar-
gins for manoeuvre. Firstly, like other Christian churches, the LDS Church
trains missionaries to speak Mandarin and gives them the specific mission
of targeting Chinese expatriates in a number of cosmopolitan megalopolises
in North America, Europe, Asia, and Oceania. Some of the people converted
in this way populate the Mormon congregations in China when they return
to the country. (43) The result of this kind of recruitment is that Mormon con-
gregations in China consist predominantly of quite young (between 20 and
40 years of age), educated, and economically dynamic individuals. In par-
ticular, they include many middle managers working in large or medium-
sized international companies, as well as businessmen and business owners.
These new Chinese Mormons have relatively high levels of international ex-
perience and cultural or economic capital. Secondly, converts are authorised
to share their faith with members of their family. Some of the growth of
the LDS Church on a local scale is provided by inter-family conversions of
this kind, which are common in Chinese Mormonism and in many other re-
ligious movements. (44) Thirdly, owing to the religious freedom that the Chi-
nese constitution is supposed to protect, a friend or acquaintance of a
convert can, if he asks the convert about his belief or practices, visit the
place of worship in order to learn more. He will not be given religious ma-
terial, but can attend an information meeting, as set out by the rules and
agreements reached with the authorities. If he then decides to embrace the
Mormon faith, he will need to go abroad to be baptised and register as a le-
gitimate member of the organisation; on his return he will be allowed to
play a full part in the religious life of the Mormon community. (45)
Another limitation the LDS Church must face concerns relations between
its headquarters and its local congregations. The official prohibition of reli-
gious contact between foreign Mormons and Chinese Mormons in the PRC,
in accordance with religious regulations intended to guard against imperi-
alist threats, prevents any direct contact between foreign Mormon leaders
and local congregations. (46) Furthermore, the few branches consisting of for-
eign expatriates in China are strictly separate from the local branches. Al-
though a few attempts were made to bring them closer together after 2004,
with the permission of the authorities, this was brought to an end with a
return to segregation that remains in force today. This rule is repeated reg-
ularly, both by expatriates and local converts, as is that concerning the pro-
hibition of any kind of proselytism. In order to make sure the link between
the local leaders and its management is maintained in these conditions, the
LDS Church calls on its members who are citizens of the PRC living abroad
to monitor the development of its local branches. Moreover, the Internet
makes it possible for local members to overcome restrictions relating to the
control imposed on the distribution of religious material, because many of
the LDS Church’s resources are available online in Mandarin.
The third limitation concerns the process of integrating converts into a
local congregation. A certain number of Chinese members who have con-
verted abroad break away from the LDS Church between their baptism
abroad and their return to China due to the limited size of the Mormon
population in China and the difficulty of meeting co-religionists who are
geographically close. But it could be speculated that those who do find their
way to local congregations after returning to China are all the more likely
to form an active core that carries the local religious dynamic forward.
Moreover, because Beijing has prohibited baptisms on the territory, locally
converted members have no option but to go to Hong Kong in order to be-
come full members of the LDS Church and join the community. They usually
organise a short stay in order to be baptised before returning to their city
of origin. The investment that this journey can represent, in terms of time
and money, could help reduce the recurrent phenomena of baptism fol-
lowed by immediate disaffiliation that many churches experience, because
it prompts potential recruits to consider their choices more carefully than
might be the case if the opportunity of a swift and inexpensive baptism
were open to them. (47) This could favour the creation of a hard core of mem-
bers with a strong attachment who are invested in the community. Accord-
ing to our sources, the level of retention of converts after baptism could
range from 50 to 70%, whereas it is generally lower in the rest of the world.
The Mormon distinction: Some hypotheses
Aside from the legal problem posed by the situation of the LDS Church,
research into the limitations and margins of manoeuvre revealed that the
restrictions imposed on the Church promote the development of an edu-
cated and economically active Mormon population that is equipped with
international experience and is receptive to the cultural content of Mor-
monism, capable of taking responsibility for the movement at a local level
and encouraged to do so. Broadly speaking, it is not unlike the new gener-
ation of city-dwelling Chinese Protestants. The situation brings together the
elements needed for swift and successful inculturation. The major question
that remains is to what extent the conditions in which the LDS Church is
spreading in China and the specific nature of the strategy used influence
the future of converts in terms of differentiating them from (or confusing
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them with) the rest of Protestant Christianity in China and the rest of
transnational Mormonism. Although the extent of the research we carried
out does not enable us to give a categorical answer, it does give rise to the
following hypotheses that future research will need to verify.
In the light of the interviews that we conducted, it became clear that the
above-mentioned strategy of observing the rules could promote a self-sus-
taining stigmatisation mechanism giving rise, to a certain degree, to an in-
novation in terms of sense of identity. No doubt due to the fact that
Mormonism only recently established itself in China, it is less subject to
specific criticism and social condemnation there than in other countries.
Distinctive Mormon practices such as the prohibition of alcohol and tobacco
consumption, observing a day of rest on Sunday, and customs characterised
by moral conservatism, do not set it significantly apart on the Chinese re-
ligious scene. Many evangelical churches share similar distinctive practices,
and dietary restrictions are a common feature of other established traditions
(vegetarianism for practising Buddhists, non-consumption of pork or alcohol
for Muslims, the historical ban on eating beef, etc.). The diverse evangelical
congregation, in particular, despite the fact that it is developing illegally,
produces believers who emphasise their Christian identity and claim a
strong social distinction. Our observations, which are based on followers at-
tending various evangelical house churches, demonstrate a strong affirma-
tion of faith ranging from wearing visible religious symbols to organising
“evangelisation” concerts, not to mention organising office prayer meetings
in non-Christian companies.
The LDS Church appears to nurture this same social distinction on an in-
ternational scale, sending recognisable missionaries around the world, financ-
ing advertising campaigns intended to enhance the image of the movement
and its members, and building its speeches around the assertion that it makes
a positive difference. Yet one thing that became clear from the interviews
we conducted with practising LDS Church converts was a tendency to limit
the visibility of their identity markers. Their accounts concerning the practice
of concealing or toning down religious markers revealed such behaviour to
be all the more pronounced when the marker in question was specific to our
Mormon sample. A 30-year-old doctor who had converted to Mormonism
during a period of study abroad described this phenomenon as follows:
I do not drink alcohol, tea, or coffee, unlike the people with whom I
work. Sometimes they ask me why, and I tell them that it’s for reli-
gious reasons, but I do not say any more than that, because it is a
very sensitive subject.
C., a 29-year-old graduate from a European university receiving training
in an international company, shares the same point of view and the same
attitude:
I have not told anyone at work that I am a Mormon, because I’m a
bit afraid to do so. I don’t want people to start asking questions or
the girls in the department to start spreading rumours (...) I want to
behave like a good person, a fair person, and be a good worker. Then,
people will see me as a good person and one day, when they find out
I’m a Mormon, they’ll say: ‘He’s a Mormon, you know. And he is not
a bad person.’
Others choose to portray themselves as Christians when responding to
the questions asked by those around them, thus adopting an identity marker
that is both more widespread and more prestigious. The wish to limit the
visibility of their Mormon identity is illustrated, in particular, in a position
repeated in several interviews concerning marriage choices. Although the
LDS religion advocates religious homogamy – the “sealing” or “celestial mar-
riage” (gaoji guodu de hunyin 高級國度的婚姻), forming the highest ritual
to attain salvation, is only open to couples who are legitimately married
and share their Mormon faith – some unmarried converts tend to minimise
the importance of this point in their answers and strategies. For example,
one convert stated the following with regard to his non-Mormon fiancée: 
Marrying a member is good because it’s easy, and you can be sealed
and have an eternal family (...). But L. is a truly good person. She is
like a traditional sister, like a Mormon sister. She respects her family
and loves family life, she respects her elders and looks after her par-
ents, and she does not have worldly concerns, so she is a really good
girl, which is important. So I think that although she is not a Mormon,
she is a wonderful sister.
Another convert, who has spent time as a missionary for the LDS Church,
also accepts the possibility of marrying a non-convert: 
It’s better if he’s a member, but there are not many brothers, and
there are still many people that I could meet and get to know; people
who also need… need our help. So it would definitely need to be
someone who can accept the change in me. After that, God has his
ways.
If confirmed, this minimisation of Mormon identity markers, which finds
expression even in the marriage strategies of some converts, could be at-
tributed to two connected factors. Firstly, it is possible that the religious
limitations in place distort the mechanisms that socialise members towards
the models advocated as standard by the LDS Church. As touched upon in
the extract above, the restricted size of Mormon communities most cer-
tainly limits the total fulfilment of the religious project on both the indi-
vidual and community levels. Secondly, it seems that the enthusiasm of the
Mormon authorities to comply with the laws of the country gives rise
among converts to the idea that their religious identity is an identity that
presents problems, whereas this element is not present in the statements
of believers affiliated to clandestine evangelical movements that do not
foster direct relations with the authorities. The Mormons we interviewed
made numerous comments concerning the political and social risk that
could result if they made too much of a display of their religious identity,
and concerning the strangeness of their situation. One young convert de-
scribed the following situation: 
They have installed surveillance cameras [at the church]... That gives
you a strange feeling. […] Because there were more than 50 of us, they
were watching us in case something a bit questionable happened. 
Yet they all accept the position of the leaders concerning the strategy that
needs to be followed, even when describing the difficulty arising from this
situation: 
If I gave a Book of Mormon [to my girlfriend] that would be frowned
upon because it is against the law in China. You can’t do that. […] I
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think the Church is taking the right course of action, because… if you
tell people that you’re a Mormon, they will think that it’s an Ameri-
can church… so you need to be careful.
What makes this statement all the more interesting is the fact that other
Christians in China generally see the Western origin of their religion to be
a positive argument. (48) The stigmatisation in this case appears rather to
be maintained internally, as a result of what could be described as the “red
church” paradox: a religious institution, wishing to be recognised by polit-
ical authorities whose aim is to control and limit religious life, must comply
with laws and regulations designed to counter its development and its very
nature.
Conclusion: The outlook for Mormonism in
China
The strategy developed by the LDS Church in a context of religious re-
striction contributes, in certain ways, to the creation of a hard core of skilled,
engaged, and autonomous Mormons. The constraints imposed by the state
and the willingness of the LDS Church to bend to these constraints appears
to be producing, when all is said and done, a slow rate of growth that could
also help it take root at a local level. Although negotiations aimed at winning
legal legitimacy have enabled the LDS Church to obtain a few margins for
manoeuvre, at the time of writing it has still not achieved any more than a
precarious semblance of recognition, and does not enjoy any kind of official
status. Moreover, the LDS Church also appears to be just as well equipped
as many similar new religious movements to forge a place for itself in a Chi-
nese market that is favourable to Western religions, especially because the
Mormon social model is similar to that of the “Boss Christians,” (49) combin-
ing traditional patriarchal values, individual recognition, and the search for
economic prosperity. Yet the inculturation process resulting from observing
the rules of the red market of religion could also have effects on the pro-
duction of a specific Chinese Mormon identity. Carrying out further research
with Mormon players, with a view to making intra-religious comparisons
(in order to compare Chinese Mormonism with other local Mormonist
movements) and inter-religious comparisons (in order to compare the de-
velopment of Mormonism with the development of other groups in China)
will help better understand these effects.
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